Quantum Advantage and Y2K Bug: Comparison by Zhang, Lei et al.
1Quantum Advantage and Y2K Bug: Comparison
Lei Zhang, Andriy Miranskyy, and Walid Rjaibi
Abstract—Quantum Computers (QCs), once they mature, will be able to solve some problems faster than Classic Computers. This
phenomenon is called “quantum advantage” (which is often used interchangeably with a stronger term “quantum supremacy”).
Quantum advantage will help us to speed up computations in many areas, from artificial intelligence to medicine. However, QC power
can also be leveraged to break modern cryptographic algorithms, which pervade modern software: use cases range from encryption of
Internet traffic, to encryption of disks, to signing blockchain ledgers.
While the exact date when QCs will evolve to reach quantum advantage is unknown (the forecasts range between months and a
decade), the consensus is that this future is near. Thus, in order to maintain crypto agility of the software, one needs to start preparing
for the era of quantum advantage proactively (before the software and associated data are compromised).
In this paper, we recap the effect of quantum advantage on the existing and new software systems, as well as the data that we
currently store. We also highlight similarities and differences between the security challenges brought by QCs and the challenges that
software engineers faced twenty years ago while fixing widespread Y2K bug. Technically, the Y2K bug and the quantum advantage
problems are different: the former was caused by timing-related problems, while the latter is caused by a cryptographic algorithm being
non-quantum-resistant. However, conceptually, the problems are similar: we know what the root cause is, the fix (strategically) is
straightforward, yet the implementation of the fix is challenging.
To address the quantum advantage challenge, we create a seven-step roadmap, deemed 7E. It is inspired by the lessons-learnt from
the Y2K era amalgamated with modern knowledge. The roadmap gives developers a structured way to start preparing for the quantum
advantage era, helping them to start planning for the creation of new as well as the evolution of the existent software.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE field of quantum computing is still young, butit has been evolving rapidly during the last decade.
The power of quantum computing will threaten modern
cybersecurity platforms. Thus, we position that the software
engineering community should start thinking about the
impact of quantum computing on cybersecurity and the
best practices to address these concerns. Let us look at the
evolution of Quantum Computers (QC).
In 1982, Feynman introduced the idea of quantum com-
puting [1]; Shor proposed the first practically relevant algo-
rithm (for breaking encryption protocols based on integer
factorization and discrete logarithm) that can be efficiently
computed on a QC in 1994 [2].
It took a while to implement an actual QC. A partnership
between academia and IBM created the first working 2-qubit
QC in 1998 [3], but it took the company 18 years to make a
5-qubit QC accessible to the public in 2016 [4].
At present, a few QCs are commercially available.
DWave started selling adiabatic QC in 2011 (although the
debate about adiabatic QC being a “true” QC is ongo-
ing1 [6]) with the current offerings having > 2000 qubits.
IBM gave access to 20- and 50-qubit gate-based supercon-
ducting QCs to academic and industrial partners to explore
practical applications in 2017 [7].
For non-commercial use, IBM offers 5- and 14-qubit
QCs via IBM Q Experience online platform based on IBM
Cloud (along with local- and Cloud-based simulators) [8].
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1. A hybrid of adiabatic and gate-based QC is promising [5], but no
commercial implementation is available.
Microsoft provides access to a simulator of a topological
QC via Microsoft Quantum Development Kit [9] (and is
planning to give access to an actual QC in the future).
Google built 72-qubit gate-based superconducting QC in
2018 [10], but it is not publicly accessible at the time of
writing.
It is said that in the future, a QC can solve some problems
much faster than a Classical Computer (CC), which is called
quantum advantage [1] (often used interchangeably with
the term quantum supremacy, which denotes an ability of
QCs to solve problems that CCs cannot). This is because QC
compute power is growing faster than CC one. The growth
of CC power was long governed by Moore’s Law [11],
i.e. the power of CCs doubling every two years (an ex-
ponential increase — O(2m), where m is the number of
years). The pace has slowed recently to doubling every 2.5
years [12], yet remains strong. Hartmut Neven, the founder
and manager of the Quantum Artificial Intelligence Lab at
Google, claimed that quantum computing power follows
more dramatic growth rate, of double exponential growth
O
(
22
m)
. If this is the case, the quantum advantage can be
achieved in a matter of months [13].
This is not a definitive prediction: the exact growth rate
of QCs is under debate. Norishige Morimoto, the director
of IBM research in Tokyo and global vice president at IBM,
claims that quantum advantage will be achieved between
years 2022–2024 [14]. Michelle Mosca, a co-founder of the
Institute for Quantum Computing and chief executive of
evolutionQ, claims that QC may outperform CC in certain
tasks after 2026 [15].
Based on the above, we can conclude that while the exact
date of achieving quantum advantage is not known, the
general consensus is that the QCs are quickly developing
and may become practical within the next decade.
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2With the vast increase in computing power, QCs promise
to revolutionize many fields, including artificial intelligence,
medicine, and space exploration [16]. But they can also
be abused to break key encryption algorithms the Internet
depends upon today for ensuring the safety and privacy of
digital information. This can be achieved by speeding up
1) factorization of integers, solving the discrete logarithm
problem, and the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem
(using Shor’s algorithm [2]); as well as 2) the search in a
set (with the help of Grover’s algorithm [17]). Both tasks
are foundational for modern encryption algorithms. Let us
elaborate.
2 THE IMPACT OF QUANTUM COMPUTING ON CY-
BERSECURITY
It is essential to understand that quantum computing will
affect encryption differently depending on the class of en-
cryption algorithm.
Below we first elaborate on the asymmetric encryption
algorithms, which are used in many areas ranging from the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol (used to safeguard
data passed between two systems on the Internet) to Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) software used to encrypt and decrypt
a file and safely transfer it between computers.
We then proceed to the symmetric encryption algo-
rithms, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), used
to protect sensitive data. There exist numerous use-cases,
ranging from encrypting a file archive (e.g., implemented
in 7z and WinZip software) to encrypting computer’s disks
(e.g, using Apple MacOS FileVault and Symantec Endpoint
Encryption).
2.1 Asymmetric encryption
Asymmetric encryption algorithms, which are based on fac-
toring large integers (e.g., Rivest–Shamir–Adleman — RSA),
discrete logarithms (e.g., Elliptic Curve Cryptography —
ECC, and Diffie-Hellman key exchange), or similar ap-
proaches (see [18], [19] for review) will need to be replaced
by quantum-resistant alternatives [18], [19]. Effective secu-
rity strength, shown in Table 1, suggests that the strength
of the RSA and ECC is somewhat weaker or comparable to
AES on a CC, but is extremely weak on a QC. This is because
Shor’s algorithm [2] can perform integer factorization in
polynomial time; so what requires thousands of years with
classical computers would only take days/hours on a large-
scale quantum computer. This, of course, assumes that a
large-scale quantum computer with the required number of
qubits exists, which is not the case right now.
2.2 Symmetric encryption
Unlike asymmetric encryption algorithms, symmetric en-
cryption algorithms do not face an existential threat: one
needs to perform a brute-force attack to break it. However,
on a classic computer generation of n keys require O(n)
operations, while on a QC it can be done using O (
√
n)
operations, thanks to Grover’s algorithm. Thus, a large
quantum computer running Grover’s algorithm could pro-
vide a quadratic improvement in brute-force attacks on sym-
metric encryption algorithms, such as AES. This translates
into a need to double key size to support the same level
of protection. For AES specifically, this means using 256-
bit keys to maintain today’s 128-bit security strength2, as
depicted in Table 1.
3 THE IMPACT ON SECURITY-CRITICAL SYSTEMS
3.1 Newly-built systems
3.1.1 Asymmetric encryption
For new systems involving a security component, practi-
tioners will have to replace modern asymmetric algorithms
(e.g., RSA) with those that are based on algebraic operations
which QC cannot perform efficiently (in comparison with a
CC). The field of post-quantum (also known as quantum-
resistant) cryptography deals with such algorithms. Exam-
ples of the principles include but are not limited to lattice-
based cryptography (e.g., used in NTRU [20] and BLISS [21]
cryptographic schemes) and hash-based cryptography (e.g.,
using Merkle Hash Tree signature [22]).
The efforts are underway to introduce cryptographic
standards for the era of quantum advantage. Currently,
NIST is running a competition to select the best quantum-
resistant algorithm. In January of 2019, they announced that
the first round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography
Standardization Process was completed by selecting 26 con-
testant algorithms, which will be further tested in the second
round of the process [23].
Thus, soon, a practitioner may be able to leverage a
standardized algorithm right away, while designing new
software. For now, when creating a new software product
that is expected to have a lifespan long enough to be affected
by the quantum advantage, we advise designing security
component in such a way that the underlying cryptographic
algorithm can be replaced with a different one.
3.1.2 Symmetric encryption
If the system requires a symmetric algorithm, then one can
leverage a standard implementation of an existing algorithm
(e.g., AES). In this case, the component has to be designed
in such a way that it can accommodate the increase of the
key length for a given algorithm.
3.2 Threats to the existing data
While large-scale quantum computers might be several
years away, someone with malicious intent could still cap-
ture sensitive encrypted data (e.g., by capturing encrypted
network packets protected with TLS or by cloning an en-
crypted disk), then store that data somewhere in a data lake.
When a large-scale quantum computer becomes available,
this person can leverage QC power to break the asym-
metric encryption used by TLS or brute-force access to the
encrypted disk and recover the sensitive data. While not
much can be done about the protocols involving asymmetric
algorithms; for the symmetric ones, we can increase the
length of the key right away to cumber the brute-force
attack [24]. We can also encrypt archived data (e.g., stored
on backup devices) with a quantum-resistant algorithm.
2. In other words, an n-bit AES cipher provides a security level of
n/2 because
√
2n = 2n/2.
3TABLE 1
Effective security strength of key encryption algorithms as per [18]
Encryption algorithm Key size (bits) Effective security level on CCs (bits) Effective security level on QCs (bits)
RSA 1024 1024 80 0
RSA 2048 2048 112 0
ECC 256 256 128 0
ECC 384 384 256 0
AES 128 128 128 64
AES 256 256 256 128
Another example is a blockchain platform using proof-
of-work algorithms. The security of current blockchain
platforms relies on a digital signature, which is based on
either Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm [25] or
RSA algorithms; both are vulnerable to QCs. Kiktenko et
al. [26] proposed a quantum-secured blockchain framework
that utilizes Quantum Key Distribution techniques via an
experimental fibre network (the cost of the network is
not disclosed). An alternative is to introduce a quantum
resistant asymmetric algorithm and recompute the Nonce
for all legacy blocks using new algorithms, which may be
expensive. A more efficient approach may be to switch to a
proof-of-stake algorithm from a proof-of-work algorithm.
3.3 Legacy systems
If the legacy system is well-designed and actively main-
tained, then the solution is straightforward: one can replace
an existing asymmetric algorithm with a new one (or in-
crease a key size of an asymmetric one) while ensuring
that the existing data can be migrated to a new format.
However, it may require a downtime to re-encrypt existing
data, and re-encrypting data is typically disruptive until the
new encrypted data are available again.
The software may run on antiquated hardware that does
not have sufficient computing power to run QC-resistant
algorithms. In this case, we may need to upgrade this
obsolete equipment or virtualize the outdated runtime en-
vironment, so that it can be executed by a hypervisor on a
more powerful computer.
Often, altering existing (legacy) system to address the
security concern may be challenging. Legacy systems fre-
quently lack adequate information or support to be main-
tained or upgraded [27]. The root causes of these issues
are numerous. For example, developers of the system may
be unavailable (e.g., because they left the company or re-
tired), source code or documentation may be lost, or build
platforms for the source code may be sunset. To make
matters worse, the encryption-related code may be spread
or cloned among multiple software components (due to bad
design), making alterations even more challenging. These
root causes make it extremely difficult and expensive to
upgrade such a system to the newest security protocols,
making the replacement the only feasible option.
4 QUANTUM ADVANTAGE AND Y2K BUG: PARAL-
LELS
All of these challenges, conceptually, pose a striking simi-
larity to the Y2K bug [28], [29], which happened around the
year 2000. The root cause of the Y2K bug was because older
software represented four-digit years with only the last two
digits, while the first two digits were fixed at 19. That is an
increment by 1 of the year 1999 would result in the year
1900 rather than the year 2000.
Obviously, the underlying root cause of the Y2K and
the quantum advantage problems are different. However,
conceptually, the solutions to the problems are similar. In the
Y2K case, we had to take the timing-related code and replace
it with a new one capable of representing years using 4
digits. In the quantum advantage case, we will have to take
an encryption-related code and either replace the algorithm
(asymmetric case) or increase key length (symmetric case).
Another difference lies in the fact that failures associ-
ated with the Y2K-related defect were encountered after a
particular date, namely, December 31, 1999. In the case of
quantum advantage, the exact date is unknown. However,
we may still leverage lessons learnt from fixing legacy
systems to fix the Y2K bug. Let us review what we have
learned from Y2K.
Putnam and Myers [30] divided the legacy systems into
three groups for the Y2K bug. The same grouping strategy
can be adopted for the quantum advantage problem: 1)
work first on those that involve life and death, 2) work on
those that are critical to the continued operation of your
organization, and 3) work on those in which security is
merely irritating, not costly.
As the era of quantum computing is approaching, some
actions can be taken now. Shimeall et al. [31] proposed
several guidelines for the security concerns before Y2K,
some of which are still applicable to our current situation:
1) existing systems must be examined and repaired, and
2) programmers and designers must be educated about the
new security challenges brought by quantum computers.
The second guideline applies to the creation of the new
systems too.
Schultz [32] described five steps that a software engi-
neer should follow to respond to the Y2K bug, which we
can utilize in our challenge: 1) gain senior management’s
acknowledgement of the potential impacts, 2) assess the
problem and alternative solutions, 3) estimate the cost and
gain approval of selected solutions, 4) execute and control
the solutions as a partner with senior management, and 5)
monitor solutions’ early results in production.
5 ROADMAP
We propose a 7E roadmap for software developers, summa-
rizing steps needed to address encryption-related challenges
4associated with quantum advantage. Our 7E roadmap con-
sists of the following seven steps:
1) Engage executives and senior management so that
they can sponsor the initiative. It is important to
get the acknowledgement from the decision makers
in your company or organization. Moreover, exec-
utives and senior management can assess security
concerns from a different perspective. To put them
in context, you can use formal presentations or
reports and incorporate feedback from them later
on.
2) Examine existing products and their cybersecurity
components to identify and locate the issues, re-
view the document and/or programs and assess the
problems. For legacy systems, there exist difficult
scenarios, such as lack of documentation, source
code, or build infrastructure. Identify existing data
(if any) that may requires protection.
3) Evolve: design a new software with crypto agility
in mind, so that quantum-resistant algorithm can
be added to the software later on. For example, the
encryption component can be designed to be plug-
and-play, so that an existing encryption algorithm
can be replaced (if it is discovered to be vulnerable)
with a robust one. This will save costs in the future,
when the standards for quantum-resistant encryp-
tion algorithms are finalized and our software has
to be updated with these algorithms.
4) Educate the programmers and designers to make
sure that everyone is ‘on the same page’ because
(in most cases) the security-related component are
coupled with the remaining software components.
This implies that the whole development organiza-
tion needs to be aware of the challenges associated
with quantum advantage.
5) Estimate the impact of potential problems and the
cost of alternatives to prioritize the problems. Rate
the cost of potential solutions in terms of human
and time resources. Work first on the systems that
handle critical data first. The definition of critical
will vary from industry to industry. A representative
example is a system handling personal data, such as
financial transactions or health records.
6) Execute the new cybersecurity policy. Select and
adopt appropriate solutions based on requirements,
budgets, and priorities. As discussed in Section 3,
practitioners can execute the new cybersecurity
policy in different ways. For newly-built systems,
post-quantum cryptography may be adopted (see
Section 3.1). For legacy systems, the software and
associated hardware may have to be altered (see
Section 3.3). For existing data, an intermediate so-
lution — e.g., re-encryption — may be applied (see
Section 3.2).
7) Essay the new cybersecurity policy. Keep monitor-
ing the performance and the robustness of your new
cybersecurity policy in production to make sure that
the challenges associated with quantum advantage
were addressed; adjust the policy if needed.
6 SUMMARY
To summarize, the community of software practitioners
needs to start preparing for the era of quantum advantage
on three fronts: 1) developing new software with new
encryption algorithms in mind, 2) upgrading the legacy
software with new encryption algorithms, or 3) migrating
the business processes to more modern software if legacy
software cannot be upgraded. The earlier we start — the
higher the chances that we will be able to address proac-
tively security challenges that this era brings with it.
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